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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-FIRST

AMENDMENT-WHEN

CON

CEPTS COLLIDE: DISPLAY PROVISIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

I.

INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 1 does
not protect all forms of speech from government interference. 2 While
it is established that obscenity does not fall within the area of constitu
tionally protected speech and press, 3 the problem of identifying and
I. The first amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first
amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); GitIow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
2. "Freedom of speech ... does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at
any time." American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950). The
Supreme Court has determined that the following classes of speech are not protected by the
first amendment: fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942);
obscenity, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); and child pornography, New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
3. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Supreme Court sustained a
conviction under a federal obscenity statute which made it unlawful to mail "obscene, lewd,
lascivious, or filthy" material and held that "obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of
speech and press." Id. at 479, 481 (citing 18 U.S.c. § 1461 (1955». In light of the history
of the first amendment, the Court noted that "the unconditional phrasing of the First
Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance." Id. at 483. Writing for the
majority, Justice Brennan observed:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unortho
dox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opin
ion-have the full protection of the [first amendment] guaranties, unless
excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important inter
ests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of ob
scenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. . . . This is the same
judgment [previously] expressed by this Court ... : "There are certain well
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These in
clude the lewd and obscene . ... It has been well observed that such utterances are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit . .. derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality . ..."
Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added by Court in Roth opinion) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942». Thus, in holding that ob
scenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech and press, the Court
grounded its justification for excluding obscenity from first amendment protection in its
belief that obscenity does not express "ideas," that it is not "essential" as a means of com
munication, that it has "slight social value," and that it contributes to disorder and
immorality.
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defining "obscenity" has proven to be an arduous task for the Supreme
Court.4 In determining whether sexually explicit material is obscene
and, hence, subject to government regulation, the Supreme Court has
recognized that some material may be obscene as to minors but not as
to adults.5 The Court embraced this concept of variable obscenity
4. The difficulty in defining obscenity led one Supreme Court Justice to write, "I
could never succeed in [defining it] intelligibly .... But I know it when I see it ...."
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.s. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Cases involving what
Justice Harlan has called the "intractable obscenity problem," Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting), have had a
"somewhat tortured history." Miller, 413 U.S. at 20 (1973). Cf Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 106-07 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Court in Miller developed the current test to identify obscenity. Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Burger established a test for determining whether particular mate
rial is "obscene" and, therefore, unprotected by the first amendment. There are three essen
tial elements of the test:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community stan
dards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest

... ,
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations. omitted). The Court thus reaffirmed the holding in Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), see supra note 3, that obscene material is not protected
by the first amendment, abandoned the "utterly without redeeming social value" standard
announced in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion), and de
clared that obscenity is to be determined by applying "contemporary community stan
dards," not "national standards." Miller, 413 U.S. at 37. Responding to the dissenting
Justices' claim of repression of speech, Chief Justice Burger wrote that equating "the free
and robust exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene
material demeans the grand conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in
the historic struggle for freedom." Id. at 34.
5. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Supreme Court upheld a New
York criminal obscenity statute that prohibited merchants from selling sexually explicit
material to minors. Material was defined as obscene based on its appeal to minors. The
statute did not restrict adult access to the same material. The Court observed that the
"well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional power to
regulate," id. at 639, and that "it was not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure
to material condemned by the statute is harmful to minors." Id. at 641. Justice Stewart,
concurring, wrote that because "a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not pos
sessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First
Amendment guarantees," a state may deprive children of rights when deprivation of those
same rights would be "constitutionally intolerable for adults." Id. at 649-50 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) ("[T]he power of
the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over
adults," even when there is an invasion of freedoms otherwise protected.); Bookcase, Inc. v.
Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 75, 271 N.Y.S.2d 947, 952, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (1966), appeal
dismissed sub nom.; Bookcase, Inc. v. Leary, 385 U.S. 12 (1966) ("[M]aterial which is pro
tected for distribution to adults is not necessarily constitutionally protected from restriction
upon its dissemination to children .... [T]he concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter
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when it upheld a regulation which prohibited the sale to minors of
materials which, though not obscene as to adults, were deemed harm
ful to minors. 6 Although the Supreme Court has upheld regulations
which prohibit the sale or distribution to minors of obscene material,7
the Court has never reviewed the constitutionality of provisions which
regulate the display of sexually explicit material. 8 Because display
provisions simultaneously restrict access to material protected as to
adults and unprotected as to minors, they fall into a gray area of cur
rent first amendment doctrine.
Recent decisions by the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth9 * and Eighth Circuits lO have addressed the first amendment
may vary according to the group to whom the questionable materittl is directed or from
whom it is quarantined.").
6. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See supra note 5. Support for a
variable concept of obscenity is also seen in other sources. Chief Justice Warren, concur
ring in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), noted in dicta that present laws defining
obscenity "depend largely upon the effect that the materials may have upon those who
receive them," and that "the same object may have a different impact, varying according to
the part of the community it reached." [d. at 495 (Warren, c.J., concurring). The first
amendment rights of minors are not "co-extensive with those of adults." Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, SIS (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring). See also
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) ("It is well settled that a State
or municipality can adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials available to
youths than on those available to adults."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170
(1944) ("[T]he power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the
scope of its authority over adults ...."); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 939 (1963) ("The world of children is not strictly part of
the adult realm of free expression. [This] factor of immaturity ... imposers] different
rules. "); Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Deve/oping Constitutional
Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 85 (1960) ("Variable obscenity ... furnishes a useful
analytical tool for dealing with the problem of denying adolescents access to material aimed
at a primary audience of sexually mature adults. For variable obscenity focuses attention
upon the make-up of primary and peripheral audiences in varying circumstances, and pro
vides a reasonably satisfactory means for delineating the obscene in each circumstance.");
Schauer, The Return of Variable Obscenity?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1277 (1977) ("The
basic principle of variable obscenity is that the determination of obscenity can only be made
in the context of the material's distribution.").
7. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
8. Display provisions, unlike the regulation upheld in Ginsberg, regulate the manner
of display of sexually explicit material. Display provisions are designed to limit juvenile
access to sexually explicit material that juveniles are prohibited from purchasing. The pro
visions generally require retailers to employ one or more of the following measures: pro
hibit juveniles from entering the store, or the portion of the store in which the material is
displayed; use blinder racks, sealed wrappers, or opaque covers; and employ minimum
height display restrictions. Without display provisions, juveniles could, conceivably, peruse
material in the store that they are prohibited by law from purchasing. See also infra note
112.

9. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 802 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 1281 (1987).
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implications of display provisions. In each case, the court considered
similar regulatory schemes that evoked two competing concerns: the
state's interest in limiting juvenile access to sexually explicit material
deemed harmful to them, and the right of adults to continued access to
the same material. Despite the similarity between the provisions under
review, the courts sharply disagreed on the extent to which the display
provisions restricted adult access to sexually explicit material. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Upper Midwest Booksellers Associa
tion v. City ofMinneapolis, II upheld the Minneapolis display provision
because it did not suppress sexually explicit material and had only an
incidental effect on adult access. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals in American Booksellers Association v. Virginia,12 invali
dated the Virginia display provision because it unreasonably restricted
adult access to material protected as to adults.
This note examines the Upper Midwest and American Booksellers
opinions. It explores the factors that both courts considered in balanc
ing the competing concerns raised by display provisions. Because the
display provisions under review did not amount to a total suppression
of protected expression, the note examines other cases in which the
Supreme Court has assessed the first amendment implications of regu
latory schemes that amount to a less-than-total suppression of pro
tected expression. The note then identifies and categorizes the various
ways in which partial bans on expression affect and limit the exercise

* Editor's Note-On January 25, 1988, the United States Supreme Court deferred ruling
on the constitutionality of the Virginia display provision and certified two questions to the
Virginia Supreme Court. Virginia v. American Bookseller's Ass'n, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4113
(U.S. Jan. 25, 1988) (No. 86-1034). The two questions that the Court certified were:
I. Does the phrase "harmful to juveniles" as used in Virginia Code §§ 18.2-390
and 18.2-391 (1982 and Supp. 1987), properly construed, encompass any of the
books introduced as plaintiffs' exhibits below, and what general standard should
be used to determine the statute's reach in light of juveniles' differing ages and
levels of maturity?
2. What meaning is to be given the provision of Virginia Code § 18.2-391(a)
(Supp. 1987) making it unlawful "to knowingly display for commercial purpose
in a manner whereby juveniles may examine or peruse" certain materials? Specif
ically, is the provision complied with by a plaintiff bookseller who has a policy of
not permitting juveniles to examine and peruse materials covered by the statute
and who prohibits such conduct when observed, but otherwise takes no action
regarding the display of restricted materials? If not, would the statute be com
plied with if the store's policy were announced or otherwise manifested to the
public?
Id. at 4117.
10. Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th
Cir. 1985).
II. 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985).
12. 802 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1281 (1987).
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of first amendment rights. Finally, the note evaluates whether the dis
play provisions in Upper Midwest and American Booksellers-as less
than-total bans on protected expression-impermissibly limit adult ac
cess to sexually explicit material that is protected as to adults by the
first amendment.

II.
A.

THE MINNEAPOLIS AND VIRGINIA DISPLAY PROVISIONS

Upper Midwest Booksellers Association v. City of Minneapolis

The Minneapolis, Minnesota, City Council enacted an ordinance
that prohibits the distribution and open display to minors of sexually
explicit material defined as harmful to minors. 13 In part, subsection 6
of the ordinance makes it unlawful "commercially and knowingly" to
display material which is "harmful to minors" in places where minors
can examine the material, "unless each item of such material is at all
times kept in a sealed wrapper."14 Subsection 6(a) of the ordinance
requires an "opaque cover" on any displayed material whose "cover,
covers, or packaging, standing alone, is harmful to minors." 15 There
13. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CITY ORDINANCE, tit. 15, § 385.131 (1984).
14. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CITY ORDINANCE, tit. 15, § 385.131(6)(1984). Subsec
tion 6 provides that:
It is unlawful for any person commercially and knowingly to exhibit, display, sell,
offer to sell, give away, circulate, distribute, or attempt to distribute any material
which is harmful to minors in its content in any place where minors are or may be
present ... and where minors are able to view such material unless each item of
such material is at all times kept in a sealed wrapper.
Id.
15. Id. at § 385.131(6)(a). Subsection 6(a) provides that:
It is also unlawful for any person commercially and knowingly to exhibit, display,
sell, ... give away, circulate, distribute, or attempt to distribute any material
whose cover, covers, or packaging, standing alone, is harmful to minors, in any
place where minors are or may be present or allowed to be present and where
minors are able to view such material unless each item of such materials is
blocked from view by an opaque cover. The requirement of an opaque cover shall
be deemed satisfied concerning such material if those portions of the cover, cov
ers, or packaging containing such material harmful to minors are blocked from
view by an opaque cover.
Id.
The ordinance defines "harmful to minors" as:
that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity,
sexual conduct, or sexual excitement, when it:
(1) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful, or morbid interest of mi
nors in sex; and
(2) is patently offensive to contemporary standards in the adult community as a
whole with respect to what is suitable sexual material for minors; and
(3) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Id. at § 385. 131(3)(e).
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are two exemptions provided in the ordinance. First, if minors are not
allowed to be present where the sexually explicit material is displayed,
subsection 6(b) discharges the requirement of sealed wrappers or
opaque covers.16 Second, subsections 7(a) and 7(b) exempt schools,
religious institutions, and other specified organizations and individuals
from liability under the ordinance. 17
Before any enforcement action was initiated under the ordinance,
Upper Midwest Booksellers Association, a retail trade organization,
and an individual bookseller,18 filed suit against the City of Minneapo
lis in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.
The plaintiffs sought a preliminary and permanent injunction re
straining the City from enforcing the display provisions of the
ordinance. 19
16. Id. at § 385.131(6)(b). Subsection 6(b) provides that:
The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply to distribution or attempt to
distribute the exhibition, display, sale, offer of sale, circulation, giving away of
material harmful to minors where such material is sold, exhibited, displayed, of
fered for sale, given away, circulated, distributed, or attempted to be distributed
under circumstances where minors are not present, not allowed to be present, or
are not able to view such material or the cover, covers, or packaging of such
material. Any business may comply with the requirements of this clause by phys
ically segregating such material in a manner so as to physically prohibit the access
to and view of the material by minors, by prominently posting at the entrance(s)
to such restricted area, "Adults Only-you must be 18 to enter," and by enforc
ing said restrictions.
Id.
17. Id. at § 385.131(7)(a), (b). In June, 1985, the Minneapolis City Council repealed
section 7 of the ordinance. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1408 n.*. Section 7 exempted the
following organizations and individuals from criminal or other prosecution under the
ordinance:
(a) Recognized and established schools, religious institutions, museums, medi
cal clinics and physicians, hospitals, public libraries, governmental agencies or
quasi governmental sponsored organizations, and persons acting in their capacity
as employees or agents of such organization. [sic] For the purpose of this section
"recognized and established" shall mean an organization or agency having a full
time faculty and diversified curriculum in the case of a school; a religious institu
tion affiliated with a national or regional denomination; a licensed physician or
psychiatrist or clinic of licensed physicians or psychiatrists; and in all other ex
empt organizations shall refer only to income tax exempted organizations which
are supported in whole or in part by tax funds or which receive at least one third
of their support from publicly donated funds.
(b) Individuals in a parental relationship with the minor.
Id. at 1408.
18. The Upper Midwest Booksellers Association and Harvey Hertz, the individual
bookseller, will hereinafter be referred to collectively as the "Booksellers Association."
19. Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 602 F. Supp. 1361,
1363 (D. Minn. 1985).

The City of Minneapolis challenged the standing of the plaintiffs. They were granted
standing because of the potential chilling effect the display provisions might have on adult
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The Booksellers Association argued that the display provisions
were overbroad because they restricted the first amendment rights of
adults.20 The Association stressed that the opaque cover requirement
restricted the ability of adults to view the cover of publications that fell
within the scope of the ordinance. Moreover, the sealed wrapper re
quirement "would prevent adults from thumbing through the book or
magazine prior to deciding whether or not to purchase it," thereby
reducing the chances that a purchase would be made. 21 The district
access. Id. at 1367-68. Under this relaxed standing requirement, it was not necessary for a
prosecution to occur before a first amendment challenge was timely. Standing was appro
priate as long as the ordinance "may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression." Id. at 1368 n.9 (quoting Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-13 (1973». The City of Minneapolis did not raise the stand
ing issue on appeal. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d 1389, 1391 n.5.
20. Upper Midwest, 602 F. Supp. at 1367. The Booksellers Association advanced
three other arguments at the district court level. First, the Booksellers Association argued
that the opaque cover provision was overbroad (in excess of the permissible scope of gov
ernmental authority and, hence, unconstitutional) because the material subject to regula
tion was not to be assessed on the basis of the work taken "as a whole." Consideration of
the cover "standing alone," they argued, violated the first amendment. Id. at 1369. The
district court rejected this argument, proclaiming that the "as a whole" standard was devel
oped in the context of an outright ban on protected material and that the Minneapolis
display provisions were an attempt to regulate the manner of display, not an attempt at
total suppression. Id. The court stressed that "[t]he context of speech is an important
factor in determining the scope of permissible regulation" and that "to a child who may
never acquire and read or view the entire work, the cover of the book or magazine is the
'work [taken] as a whole.' " Id.
Second, the Booksellers Association argued that the provision of the ordinance ex
empting schools and other organizations from liability violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, and that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of re
view for assessing the ordinance's classifications. The City of Minneapolis argued, unsuc
cessfully, that the rational basis test was the appropriate standard of review and that the
exemption provision was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The court
reviewed the ordinance with strict scrutiny and found that the exemption was not necessary
to serve a compelling governmental interest because the overall scheme of the ordinance
applied only to harmful commercial display, not non-commercial uses such as sex educa
tion. The court severed the exemption provision as unconstitutional. Id. at 1373-75.
Having determined that the exemption provision violated the equal protection clause,
the court never reached plaintiffs' third argument that an exemption for a religious organi
zation constituted an establishment of religion in violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 1367 n.7.
21. Upper Midwest, 602 F. Supp. at 1370. The Booksellers Association also argued
that the ordinance would reduce adult access to protected materials because retailers, wary
of potential prosecution, would self-censor their merchandise, thereby depriving adults of
access to protected materials. The district court rejected this argument, summarily reason
ing that the scienter component of the ordinance, which required that violations of its
provisions be "knowing ... undercuts the argument that retailers would practice self-cen
sorship." Id. at 1372-73.
The Booksellers Association also argued that the ordinance was an impermissible
time, place, and manner regulation because it was not content-neutral. Id. at 1370-71. The
district court rejected this argument, stating that content-based time, place, and manner
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court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, upheld the display provisions,
and denied the plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief. 22
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court
decision and stated that the City of Minneapolis had "struck an appro
priate balance between its legitimate interest in the protection of its
young and allowing adults access to material protected under the First
Amendment."23 The Booksellers Association again argued: (1) that
the opaque cover requirement was invalid as overbroad because the
material subject to regulation must be identified on the basis of the
work taken as a whole, not on the basis of the cover standing alone;24
(2) that the display provision was an impermissible time, place, or
manner restriction because it unreasonably restricted adult access to
material protected as to adults under the first amendment;25 and
(3) that the display provision did not qualify as a permissible time,
place, or manner restriction because it was not content-neutra1. 26
Writing for the majority, Judge Bowman observed that in order
for the ordinance under review to be invalid, its overbreadth must be
both "real" and "substantial" in relation to the permissible sweep of
the ordinance. 27 The display provision, therefore, had to be "substan
tially overbroad" in order for the court to invalidate it on its face. 28
Judge Bowman considered whether the Minneapolis ordinance defined
regulations are permissible if they further a significant government interest, are narrowly
tailored, and impose only a minimal burden on first amendment rights. Id.
22. Upper Midwest, 602 F. Supp. at 1376.
23. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1395.
24. Id. at 1392-94.
25. Id. at 1394-96.
26. Id. at 1396-98. The Booksellers Association also argued that the district court
committed reversible error by severing subsection 7(a) from the ordinance after having
determined that it violated the equal protection clause. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit ruled that severance of the exemption provision was appropriate because,
even without the exemption, the overall scheme of the ordinance was still intact. Id. at
1398-99. See supra note 20.
27. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1391-92 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 V.S. 747,
770 (1982». Overbreadth analysis focuses on the extent to which an arguably permissible
regulatory scheme (such as display provisions designed to protect juveniles from the harm
ful effects of sexually explicit materials) has an impact upon activity protected under the
first amendment (such as adult access to sexually explicit material). A regulation is over
broad if it reaches beyond its intended scope and has a chilling effect on protected activity.
Overbreadth challenges can be brought on behalf of those not before the court when poten
tial or actual enforcement of the regulation may serve to deter the exercise of first amend
ment rights. See Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. I; Redish, The Warren
Court. the Burger Court and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. V.L.
REV. 1031 (1983); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV.
844 (1970).
28. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1392.
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the material subject to regulation in a manner consistent with the defi
nition of obscenity approved in Ginsberg v. New York 29 and Miller v.
California. 30 He found that the ordinance's definition of mat~rial
harmful to minors was substantially the same as the definition of vari
able obscenity approved in Ginsberg, and modified in Miller. That def
inition allowed for greater state regulation to shield juveniles from
material otherwise protected by the first amendment. 31
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also reviewed whether the
display provision was a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction
on speech otherwise protected under the first amendment. 32 The court
of appeals, like the district court, considered whether the display pro
vision sought to further "significant governmental interests,"33 was
"reasonably structured" to further those interests,34 and left open
" 'adequate alternative channels of communication' " with only inci
dental effects on continued adult access. 35
The court observed that although obscene material is not pro
tected by the first amendment, the material subject to regulation under
29. 390 u.s. 629 (1968).
30. 413 U.s. 15 (1973).
31. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1392. The court then considered whether the Min
neapolis display provision was invalid because the material subject to regulation was to be
assessed on the basis of the cover standing alone. The Booksellers Association argued that
material subject to regulation must be assessed on the basis of the work taken as a whole.
Id. at 1392-93. The Booksellers Association cited Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972),
and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), in support of its position. The
court rejected this argument and agreed with the district court's position that the taken "as
a whole" requirement applied only to situations where there was an attempt to suppress
obscene material completely or prosecute someone for its distribution. Upper Midwest, 780
F.2d at 1393. The opaque cover provision, in regulating the manner of display, was valid
because it did not suppress distribution of the material. Id.
32. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1394. As a general rule, time, place, or manner
restrictions of otherwise protected speech are permissible if the restrictions are content
neutral, narrowly tailored, serve a significant government interest, and leave open adequate
alternative channels for communication. See, e.g., City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 803-12 (1984); Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288,
293-94 (1984); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640,
647-48 (1981).
33. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1392-94. The court found that the Minneapolis City
Council, believing that sexually explicit material was harmful to the development of
juveniles into mature adults, "acted in response to what it perceive[d] to be a matter of
serious concern ... to the well-being of the City's young," and that the City had a signifi
cant iryterest in protecting juveniles from the harmful effects of sexually explicit material.
Id. at 1399. The court noted that the City'S elected representatives were not necessarily
mistaken in their perception of the problem and that "it [was] not the business of the courts
to second-guess the wisdom or efficacy of validly enacted legislation." Id.
34. Id. at 1395.
35. Id. at 1396 (quoting Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76
(1981».
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the Minneapolis ordinance was not obscene as to adults. 36 The ordi
nance, in regulating the display of material obscene as to juveniles but
not obscene as to adults, presented a unique problem because, to some
extent, it limited the ability of adults to browse through the material. 37
The dispositive question, therefore, was whether Minneapolis had
struck an appropriate accommodation between competing concerns:
the. City's interest in pr.otecting juveniles and the protection afforded
adults under the first amendment.
The Booksellers Association again argued that the ordinance was
an invalid time, place, or manner restriction because its incidental ef
fect impermissibly limited "the ability of adults to visit a bookstore or
newsstand and browse through material that is obscene as to children
but not as to adults."38 Rejecting this argument, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals stressed that retailers were not prohibited from
stocking and selling the material covered under the ordinance, and
that adults could still purchase the material despite the restrictions on
juvenile access. 39 The court balanced the state's significant interest in
protecting juveniles with the impact the ordinance had on adult ac
cess. In doing so, the court observed that adults could still "request a
copy of restricted material to view from a merchant," or "view any of
the material in a free and unfettered fashion by purchasing it."40 The
court also stated that any burden on adults was "merely an incidental
effect of the permissible regulation and [was] minimal in its impact,"
and that the "continued availability of these materials to adults for
purchase under the ordinance weigh[ed] strongly in favor of the ordi
nance's constitutionality."41 The court concluded that because the
material subject to regulation was not suppressed, and because adults
continued to have ultimate access to the material, the ordinance left
36. /d. at 1395.
37. Id.
38. /d. at 1394.
39. Id. at 1395. The Booksellers Association argued that the display provisions, be
cause of their impact on adult access, were invalid under the holding in Butler v. Michigan,
352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (invalidating a Michigan statute that made it unlawful to make
available or possess any material "tending to the corruption of the morals of youth"). The
court distinguished Butler on the ground that the statute in Butler, which was an absolute
prohibition on the sale of sexually explicit material, resulted in the total suppression of the
material covered by the statute. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1395. The Minneapolis dis
play provision did not amount to total suppression within the meaning of Butler because
retailers were not prohibited from selling the material subject to regulation. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply Butler to a "reasonably structured" display regu
lation intended to protect juveniles which happened to simultaneously affect adults. /d.
See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
40. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1395.
41. /d.
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open adequate alternative channels of communication to satisfy the
requirements of the first amendment. 42
Finally, the court addressed whether the ordinance was a valid
time, place, and manner restriction because it was not content-neu
tra1. 43 In declaring that not all content-based restrictions were in va
lid,44 the court focused on whether the Minneapolis display provision
was a "reasonable means" of controlling juvenile access to material
obscene as to them. 45 The court emphasized that the display provision
merely restricted the manner and place in which sexually explicit ma
terial could be displayed and that the City's "substantial interest in the
well-being of its youth" supported the classification under review. 46
The display provision, in sum, did not violate the first amendment.
Chief Judge Lay, in dissent, wrote that "no ordinance or law writ
ten in such sweeping terms has, until today, gained constitutional ap
42. Id. at 1396.
43. Id. Content-neutral restrictions regulate and limit expression without considera
tion of the message conveyed. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 793,
803-04 (1984). See also United States Postal Servo v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns,
453 U.S. 114, 126-31 (1981) (upholding a federal content-neutral statute prohibiting all
unstamped "mailable matter" from being placed in any private-home letterbox); Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding a Minne
sota State Fair regulation that prohibited the distribution of all leaflets on fairgrounds ex
cept from an approved booth). Content-based restrictions generally are subject to exacting
scrutiny because of the concern that regulation of expression based on its message, ideas, or
subject matter impliedly favors particular ideas or viewpoints. See, e.g., Police Dep't V.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating an ordinance that prohibited all picketing near a
school but allowed peaceful labor picketing). For a comprehensive analysis of the content
neutral and content-based distinction see Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amend
ment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983). See also Stephan, The First Amendment and
Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203 (1982); Farber, Content Regulation and the
First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980).
44. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1396 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774
(1982); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976».
45. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1396.
46. Id. In support of its position, the court observed that the material subject to
regulation was likely to be on the " 'borderline between pornography and artistic expres
sion' " and that the first amendment interests at stake were of less concern--or of lower
value-than material involving the expression of social or political ideas. Id. (quoting
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976». Justice Stevens developed
this theory of lower level speech in Young. In Young, Justice Stevens observed that there is
a "less vital interest" in protecting sexually explicit material than in protecting the dissemi
nation of higher level social and political expressions. Young, 427 U.S. at 61 (Stevens, J.,
plurality opinion). "[S)ociety's interest in protecting [sexually explicit) expression is of a
wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate
...." Id. at 70. Under this theory, adopted by some members of the Supreme Court,
different levels of speech are thus entitled to different degrees of protection under the first
amendment. See also F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
plurality opinion) (patently offensive references "lie at the periphery of First Amendment
concern").

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

144

[Vol. 10:133

proval."47 He argued that the Minneapolis display provIsIon
unreasonably encroached on the freedom of speech protected by the
first amendment and was not "reasonably restricted to the evil" which
it purported to address. 48 Chief Judge Lay argued that "[i]n promot
ing the morals of its youths by restricting their access to certain com
munications ... [the City of Minneapolis] may not simultaneously
create barriers that substantially restrict adult access to material they
are constitutionally entitled to obtain."49
The Chief Judge examined the opaque cover provision of the or
dinance and the alternative restrictions of an "adults only" section or
an "adults only" store. 50 He found that there was a "stigma" attached
to the "adults only" label that might cause many adults-who would
otherwise purchase the material-to "forgo exercising their first
amendment rights to purchase non obscene literature ...."51 More
over, booksellers, realizing that the stigma attached to the "adults
only" display alternative would result in the loss of adult patronage,
might choose instead to sell only that material which would not fall
under the ordinance as harmful to minors. This approach, he argued,
"could very easily lead to the suppression of many literary works, in
cluding classics and other best sellers."52
Addressing the sealed wrapper provision of the Minneapolis ordi
nance, the Chief Judge considered whether it was a reasonable time,
place, or manner restriction. He focused on whether Minneapolis had
demonstrated a "significant government interest" and whether the
sealed wrapper provision was "narrowly drawn" to further that
Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1399 (Lay, c.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Id.
49. Id. at 1403.
50. See supra notes 15 and 16 and accompanying text for a description of these provi
sions of the Minneapolis ordinance.
5!. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1402 (Lay, c.J., dissenting).
52.
Id. Chief Judge Lay rejected the majority's argument that it was permissible
under the opaque cover requirement to assess material subject to regulation on the basis of
its cover standing alone. Relying heavily on Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205 (1975), Judge Lay argued that the "as a whole" evaluation requirement applied equally
to regulations involving suppression as well as those regulating manner of display. Upper
Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1400-01 (Lay, c.J., dissenting). His primary concern, however, was
that the opaque cover provision also limited juvenile access to material protected as to
juveniles-a possibility never considered by the majority. Id. at 1400. The opaque cover
requirement did not apply to material that, as a whole, was obscene as to juveniles. Under
the ordinance, such material was to be displayed in a sealed wrapper because, as a whole, it
was obscene as to juveniles. The Chief Judge argued that the opaque cover requirement
thus resulted in the "absurdity" that juveniles were prohibited from viewing the cover of
the material on display but were still entitled to examine or buy the entire item if, taken as a
whole, it was not obscene. Id. at 1401.
47.
48.
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interest.53
Chief Judge Lay did not dispute that Minneapolis had a legiti
mate interest in promoting the welfare and morals of its youth by lim
iting their access to material obscene as to juveniles. He found, rather,
that the sealed wrapper provision was not narrowly drawn and was
more restrictive than necessary to achieve its designated purpose. 54
Chief Judge Lay argued that the "unavoidable collateral effect" of the
provision was to "severely limit" the ability of adults to examine pro
tected materials,55 because the "practical effect" of the sealed wrapper
provision was to restrict adult access to that which is suitable for chil
dren. 56 The sealed wrapper provision, he argued, "would either pre
clude adults from browsing through material prior to purchase or
would place a heavy burden on store owners to restructure their stores
...."57 Furthermore, the dissent noted that "[t]he ordinance over
looks the fact that the display of magazines and books plays a vital
role in the bookseller's ability to advertise and sell its merchandise"
and that "many adults who would be required to unseal this [sexually
explicit] literature in public areas in order to peruse the book or maga
zine would be embarrassed to do so. "58 The dissent concluded that
the Minneapolis ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad because
its impact on adult access to sexually explicit material went considera
bly beyond its articulated purpose of protecting juveniles. 59
B.

American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Virginia

The Virginia General Assembly amended a Virginia statute that
made it "unlawful for any person knowingly to sell or loan to a juve
nile" sexually explicit material defined by the statute as harmful to
juveniles. 6O The amendment made it unlawful knowingly to display
the harmful materials "in a manner whereby juveniles may examine
and peruse" them. 61 Unlike the Minneapolis ordinance, the Virginia
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1403.
Id. at 1403-04.
Id. at 1403.
Id. at 1404.
Id.
[d.

0

Id. The Chief Judge also disagreed with the majority on the severability of the
exemption provision of the ordinance. Id. at 1404-06. Judge Lay argued that severing the
exemption provision rendered the entire Minneapolis ordinance invalid because severance
alone impermissibly changed the overall intended effect of the ordinance. /d. See supra
note 20.
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-391(a) (Supp. 1985).
61. Id. Section 18.2-391(a) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell or loan to a juvenile, or to
59.
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statute did not enumerate specific methods of display-such as opaque
covers or sealed wrappers-that would enable a merchant to comply
with the terms of the statute. The definition of material that was
"harmful to juveniles," however, was similar to the definition provided
in the Minneapolis ordinance. 62
The American Booksellers Association, a retail trade associa
tion,63 challenged the constitutionality of the amendment in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The
Booksellers sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the en
forcement of the amendment. 64 The district court declared the
knowingly display for commercial purpose in a manner whereby juveniles may
examine and peruse:
(I) Any picture, photography, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, or
similar visual representation or image of a person or portion of the human body
which depicts sexually explicit nudity, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse
and which is harmful to juveniles, or
(2) Any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however reproduced, or
sound recording which contains any matter enumerated in subdivision (1) of this
subsection, or explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of
sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse and which taken as a
whole, is harmful to juveniles.

Id.
62. See supra note 15. Virginia .defined "harmful to juveniles" as sexually explicit
material having a quality, in whatever form, which:
(a) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of
juveniles,
(b) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a
whole with respect to what is suitable material for juveniles, and
(c) is, when taken as a whole, lacking in serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value for juveniles.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-390.6 (Supp.1985).
63. Four other trade associations, two retail bookstores and an individual adult and
juvenile member of the community were also named as plaintiffs [hereinafter collectively
referred to as the "Booksellers"]. The court granted standing to the trade associations and
bookstores but denied standing to the individual plaintiffs. American Booksellers Ass'n v.
Strobel, 617 F. Supp. 699, 703-04 (E.D. Va. 1985). The standing arguments advanced by
both parties were similar to those reviewed in Upper Midwest. See supra note 19. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that standing was appropriate because of the
Booksellers' claim that the Virginia amendment might deter the exercise of protected first
amendment rights. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 802 F.2d 691, 694 (4th Cir.
1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1281 (1987).
64. The defendants were the Commonwealth of Virginia, William K. Stover, Chief of
Pol!ce for Arlington County, Virginia, and Charles T. Strobel, Director of Public Safety for
the City of Alexandria, Virginia [hereinafter collectively referred to as "Virginia"]. Strobel
was not a party to the appeal.
The Booksellers also sought attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1988 (1982). The
court of appeals reversed, in part, the district court's denial of the Booksellers' request for
attorneys' fees. Attorneys' fees were, on remand, to be assessed against Virginia, but not
against defendants Strobel and Stover. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 802 F.2d
691,696-97 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1281 (1987).
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amendment unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. 65
The district court found that in order to comply with the amend
ment, a merchant had one of four options suggested by Virginia, none
of which were enumerated in the statute. 66 A merchant could bar all
persons under the age of eighteen from entering the store, create an
"adults only" section, limit inventory to books and magazines not reg
ulated under the amendment, or place all proscribed material behind a
counter. 67 The court noted that the manner in which a particular pub
lication is displayed plays a crucial role in determining how many cop
ies will sell. Moreover, customers generally make a purchase only
after browsing and are reluctant to ask openly for books with a strong
sexual content. 68 The court considered these factors and observed that
while the intended effect of the amendment was to prevent the exami
nation and perusal by minors of harmful material, the "unavoidable
collateral effect" of the law was to "severely limit" the ability of adults
to examine material protected as to them by the first amendment. 69
Thus, the amendment was unconstitutional because it created a barrier
which placed "substantial restrictions" upon adult access to sexually
explicit material. 70
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, affirming the dis
trict court, held that the display provision of the Virginia amendment
was facially unconstitutional for overbreadth because it unreasonably
interfered with the way in which booksellers conducted their business
activities and unreasonably restricted adult access to materials pro
tected under the first amendment.7 1 The court held that the most seri
ous flaw of the amendment was its overbreadth because it had "both a
65.
66.
67.

American Booksellers Ass'n v. Strobel, 617 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Va. 1985).
Id. at 702-03.
Id.
68. Id. at 702.
69. Id. at 706.
70. Id. at 705. The district court also considered whether the Virginia amendment
was a valid time, place, and manner regulation. The" 'crucial question,' " according to the
court, was whether the manner of expression sought to be regulated was" 'basically incom
patible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.''' Id. at 706
(quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (upholding an ordinance
barring demonstrations near a school that would disturb or interfere with school activities
because disruptive demonstrations were incompatible with normal school activities». The
court held that the amendment was an invalid time, place, and manner regulation because
it was not narrowly drawn. The display of sexually explicit material-the regulated expres
sion-was not incompatible with the environment-retail establishments-in which it was
displayed. Id.
71. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 802 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 1281 (1987).
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real and substantial deterrent effect on protected expression."72
Virginia argued on appeal that the amendment was a valid time,
place, and manner regulation and that "compliance with the amend
ment would not deter the exercise of first amendment rights."73 Book
sellers, they argued, could "readily modify their display methods to
comply with the amendment."74 The appeals court disagreed.
The court claimed that booksellers faced a "substantial problem
[in] attempting to comply with the amendment in ordering, reviewing,
and displaying publications for sale" because the display methods sug
gested by Virginia were either "insufficient to comply with the amend
ment or unduly burdensome on the first amendment rights of
adults. "75 The court reviewed the compliance options suggested by
Virginia and noted that "[p]lacing 'adults only' tags on books and
magazines or displaying the restricted material behind blinder racks 76
or on adults only shelves" would not prevent juveniles from examining
and perusing the materials and, hence, the merchant would still be
subject to prosecution under the amendment. 77 The other options of
creating a separate and restricted "adults only" area, requiring sealed
wrappers, or placing the material behind a counter would, according
to the court, "unreasonably" and "significantly" interfere with the
bookseller's right to sell the restricted materiaP8 and "unrealistically"
limit adult access. 79 Moreover, many adults would be hesitant to enter
segregated-and clearly identified-"adults only" areas in order to
make a purchase. 80 The amendment was thus unconstitutional be
cause it "discourage[d] the exercise of first amendment rights in a real
and substantial fashion. "81
72. Id. at 695.
73. Id. at 695-96. Booksellers, they argued, were still entitled to stock the inaterial
subject to regulation. Id. at 695.
74. Id. at 696.
75. Id. at 696. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly disagreed with the
holding in Upper Midwest. Id. at 696.
76.' Blinder racks block or "blind" the cover of magazines from public view. The
display racks either contain a shield that blocks the bottom three-quarters of a magazine's
cover or a shield that blocks the cover entirely. The three-quarter shield allows a customer
to read the title printed at the top of the publication without having to lift the shield. With
a full shield, however, a customer does not know which magazines are available unless the
shield is lifted or it identifies the publication being blocked from view.
77. American Booksellers, 802 F.2d at 696.
78. These potential methods of compliance interfered with the normal business prac
tices of booksellers who previously were able to display merchandise without any
restrictions.
79. American Booksellers, 802 F.2d at 696.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF DISPLAY PROVISIONS

The display provisions under review in Upper Midwest and Amer
ican Booksellers both regulated the manner and, to some extent, the
place in which sexually explicit material could be displayed. Although
both courts agreed that the display provisions placed some burden on
adult access, they disagreed about the extent of the burden created by
the display provisions. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
stressed that the Mimieapolis ordinance did not suppress sexually ex
plicit material and held that the display provisions only had an inci
dental and minimal effect on adult access. 82 The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in contrast, struck down the Virginia amendment because
it was unduly burdensome and' unreasonably restricted, in a real and
substantial way, adult access to material protected as to adults. 83 Both
opinions turned on the degree to which each court perceived that dis
play provisions-by regulating the manner of display of material
deemed harmful to minors-limited adult access to the same sexually
explicit material. 84
Display provisions, by their nature, fall into the "interstices of
current First Amendment doctrine" because they "simultaneously af
fect[ ] material protected in relation to one group--adults-and un
protected in relation to another group--minors .... "85 Under current
first amendment doctrine, obscene material is not entitled to any con
82. See supra notes 23-46 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
84. The basic drafting difference between the Minneapolis and Virginia display pro
visions did not, in and of itself, cause the different outcomes in Upper Midwest and Ameri
can Booksellers. The Minneapolis display provision, unlike the Virginia provision, provided
opaque covers, sealed wrappers, and "adults only" sections as specific methods of compli
ance. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. The Virginia provision made it un
lawful to display the material subject to regulation in a manner whereby juveniles could
"examine and peruse" it. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. The provision did
not "provide any potential defenses or methods of compliance." American Booksellers, 802
F.2d at 695. The primary concern of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was the impact
that display provisions have on adult access to sexually explicit material, not the absence of
potential defenses or the absence of specific methods of compliance in the Virginia provi
sion. The court in American Booksellers rejected, as unduly burdensome, the specific meth
ods of compliance suggested by Virginia. [d. at 696. The methods of compliance would
have been just as burdensome had they been enumerated in the statute itself. Furthermore,
the court expressly disagreed with the holding in Upper Midwest that display provisions
could be "legitimized" by enumerating specific display methods which would place a
merchant in compliance with the statute. [d. at 695 n.8 (citing Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at
1390-91).
85. Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389, 1394
(8th Cir. 1985).
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stitutional protection. 86 In Miller v. California,87 the Supreme Court
established the test for determining whether particular material is ob
scene and, therefore, not protected by the first amendment. The Court
upheld a California statute that made it unlawful to knowingly dis
tribute material defined as "obscene."88 If material is identified as
"obscene" under the Miller test, it is obscene as to both children and
adults. Merchants are not only prohibited from displaying obscene
material, they are prohibited from stocking and distributing it as well.
In Ginsberg v. New York,89 the Supreme Court held that the defi
nition of obscenity can. vary according to the audience at which the
material is directed. 90 Under this concept of "variable obscenity," it is
permissible constitutionally to accord juveniles "a more restricted
right than that assured to adults to judge and determine for themselves
what sex material they may read or see."91 Thus, the Court in Gins
berg upheld a New York statute that regulated the sale to juveniles
not the manner of display-of material defined as obscene as to
juveniles but not obscene as to adults. The statute upheld in Ginsberg
did not affect the ability of adults to examine or purchase the sexually
explicit material. 92
Display provisions, in theory, are designed to complement the
concept of variable obscenity and the restriction on sales upheld in
Ginsberg. It would seem to follow that if the state can protect
juveniles by preventing merchants from selling them sexually explicit
material, the state can also protect juveniles by limiting their access to
the harmful materia1. 93 Without display provisions, juveniles could
86. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (upholding a conviction under the Cali
fornia Penal Code for knowingly distributing material defined as obscene).
87. Id. See supra note 4.
88. Miller, 413 U.S. at 37.
89. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
90. See supra notes 5-6 and 'accompanying text.
91. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 637. In Ginsberg, a New York criminal obscenity statute
prohibited the sale of obscene material to minors under seventeen years of age. Sexually
explicit material was defined as obscene on the basis of its appeal to minors. The court
upheld the conviction of a merchant who sold two sexually explicit magazines to a sixteen
year-old boy. Id.
92. Whereas Ginsberg expanded the definition of obscenity to encompass a broader
range of material subject to regulation when juveniles are included in the viewing audience,
display provisions, as an extension of Ginsberg, seek to prevent juveniles from viewing that
material.
93. The Supreme Court has recognized the state's interest in protec~ing minors from
exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978). In Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986), a high school
student delivered a speech at a high school assembly nominating another student for elec
tive office. School officials viewed the speech, which described the candidate as a man who
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browse through material on display that they are otherwise prohibited
from purchasing. 94 The problem, of course, is that display provisions,
unlike the prohibition on sale upheld in Ginsberg, also affect the ability
of adults to view and purchase the same material. 95
.The extent to which display provisions actually limit adult access
to sexually explicit material is the central concern of both Upper Mid
west and American Booksellers. Without display prOVISIons,
merchants are free to display material offered for sale as they see fit. If
the book or magazine is on open display, a potential customer can
examine the material and make a purchase free of any limitations. Re
strictive display provisions, however, affect the way in which retailers
can merchandise sexually explicit material. They also limit the ability
of adults to visit bookstores and freely browse through material that
they are constitutionally entitled to obtain. The extent of this burden
on adult access to sexually explicit material, the way in which the burwas "firm in his pants, ... who takes his point and pounds it in" and was willing to go to
the "climax" for his constituents, id. at 3167 (Brennan, J., concurring), as offensively lewd
and indecent speech. Id. at 3162. The student was suspended for two days after admitting
that he had deliberately used sexual innuendo.
The Supreme Court, upholding the decision to suspend the student, accepted the
school district's argument below, that it had an interest-superior to the student speaker's
first amendment concerns-in protecting "an essentially captive audience of minors from
lewd and indecent language." Id. at 3163. The Court pointed out that there are "limita
tions on the otherwise absolute interest of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience
where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience may include children." Id. at 3165.
The Court was thus unwilling to extend first amendment protection to the speech because it
was presented in a public school.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan stressed that the Fraser opinion was limited
only to the school's authority to regulate the language used in the school environment and
not to public debate outside of the school. Id. at 3167 n.l (Brennan, J., concurring). This
statement is important because both Fraser and Ginsbe'6'-unlike Upper Midwest and
American Booksellers-involved a predominantly juvenile audience. Fraser was confined to
protecting juveniles and had no collateral effect on the ability of adults to hear protected
speech. Thus, although Fraser illustrates the extent to which Ginsbe'6' can be extended to
protect juveniles from sexually explicit speech, Fraser does not address the concerns raised
by display provisions. Adults are not the primary audience at public school assemblies as
they are at stores that stock sexually explicit material. They are not affected by the type of
prohibition upheld in Fraser. However, adults are confronted unavoidably by the burdens
associated with display provisions.
94. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania expressed the view that regulating the sale
of sexually explicit material to minors without simultaneously controlling the commercial
display of the material would seem to render efforts to protect juveniles meaningless.
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Rendell, 332 Pa. Super. 537, 581-82, 481 A.2d 919, 942
(1984).
95. The Supreme Court has had great difficulty with "hybrid regulations" such as
display provisions which involve government limitations on speech in a specific context.
Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context
in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1219 (1984).
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den is to be characterized and measured, and the extent to which the
burden can be tolerated, remain unclear after Upper Midwest and
American Booksellers.
A.

Regulations That Result in the Total Suppression of a Category
of Protected Expression

Display provisions do not suppress completely the availability of
sexually explicit material. The Supreme Court has held that regula
tions that result in the total suppression of a category of protected
expression violate the first amendment. 96 In Butler v. Michigan,97 the
Supreme Court reviewed a Michigan statute that made it unlawful, in
any setting, to make available or possess any material "tending to the
corruption of the morals of youth . . . ."98 The statute prohibited
adults and minors from distributing or possessing the material subject
to regulation. The Supreme Court invalidated the statute because its
result was "to reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only
what is fit for children."99 The statute, in effect, suppressed material
that adults were entitled to obtain.loo
Similarly, in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,101 the Court
reviewed a zoning ordinance that prohibited all live entertainment in
any establishment in the borough. \02 The operators of an adult estab
lishment were convicted of violating the ordinance when they installed
a coin-operated booth that permitted customers to watch live nude
96. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73-74 (1983); Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65-68 (1981); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,
383 (1957).
.
97. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
98. Id. at 381.
99. Id. at 383.
100. See also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). In Bolger,
the Supreme Court invalidated a federal statute which barred the unsolicited mailing of
advertisements for contraceptives. The government asserted an interest in assisting parents
in their efforts to discuss birth control with their children when they saw fit. Although the
court found a substantial governmental interest in preventing unsolicited home intrusions
and helping parents, the statute was invalid because it was far more restrictive than neces
sary. The statute shut down the flow of the unsolicited mailings and blocked advertise
ments that were suitable for adults. The court proclaimed that the "level of discourse
reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sand
box." Id. at 74.
101. 452 U.S. 61 (1981). See also Note, Municipalities May Not Exclude Live En
tertainment From Areas Zoned for Commercial Uses: Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,
86 DICK. L. REV. 391 (1982); Note, Zoning Prohibition Which Impinges Upon First
Amendment Activity Must be Adequately Justified by Municipality, 12 SETON HALL L.
REV. 311 (1982).
102. Schad, 452 U.S. at 62.
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dancers perform behind a glass panel. 103 The borough argued that the
ordinance permissibly suppressed live entertainment because adults
still had ample opportunity to view such entertainment in neighboring
communities. 104 The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, empha
sizing that "when a zoning law infringes upon a protected liberty, it
must be narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial
government interest."105 The ordinance significantly limited a pro
tected activity by banning live entertainment, including nude dancing,
and made it necessary for adults to go outside of the borough to see
live entertainment. As a result, the Supreme Court scrutinized the
"interests advanced by the Borough to justify this limitation on pro
tected expression and the means chosen to further those interests."106
The ordinance was invalid because the Borough failed to justify ade
quately its "substantial restriction of protected activity"107 and to es
Id. at 62-64.
104. Id. at 76. The Court rejected this argument, stressing that protected expression,
otherwise appropriate in one location, could not be suppressed in the borough merely be
cause it was possible to exercise the right elsewhere. Id. at 76-77 (citing Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939».
105. Schad, 452 U.S. at 68. Although the Court observed that live entertainment is
expression protected by the first amendment, id. at 65, and that "nude dancing is not
without its First Amendment protections from official regulation," id. at 66, the Court did
not resolve the status of nude dancing within the protection of the first amendment. Be
cause the Mount Ephraim ordinance prohibited all live entertainment in the Borough and
not only nude dancing, the Court addressed only the broader question of the status of live
entertainment under the first amendment.
Recently, in City of Newport v. Iacobucci, 107 S. Ct. 383 (1986) (per curium summary
disposition), the Supreme Court upheld a Newport, Kentucky, ordinance that prohibits
"nude or nearly nude" dancing in establishments licensed to sell liquor for consumption on
the premises. The ordinance was promulgated under the state's broad power under the
twenty-first amendment to regulate the sale of liquor within its boundaries. The City of
Newport determined that the combination of nude dancing and serving liquor was harmful
to the residents of the city. Id. at 386. The ordinance was designed to stabilize neighbor
hoods and reduce "crime, disorderly conduct and juvenile delinquency." Id. Stressing that
there is a presumption that regulations under the twenty-first amendment are valid, the
Court noted that Newport's "interest in maintaining order outweighs the interest in free
expression by dancing nude." Id. See also New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452
U.S. 714,717 (1981) (per curium summary disposition) ("The State's power to ban the sale
of alcoholic beverages entirely includes the lesser power to ban the sale of liquor on prem
ises where topless dancing occurs."); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972) (state
power under the twenty-first amendment to regulate the sale of liquor outweighs any first
amendment interest in nude dancing). Justice Stevens dissented in Iacobucci because of the
"blatantly incorrect" reasoning that the "Twenty-first Amendment shields restrictions on
speech from full First Amendment review." Iacobucci, 107 S. Ct. at 386 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
106. Schad, 452 U.S. at 71.
107. Id. at 72. The Borough argued that the ordinance was necessary to further its
substantial interest in creating commercial zones that would cater to the "immediate
needs" of its residents. Id. at 72-73. Rejecting this argument, the Court found that the
103.
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tablish that its interests could not be met by less intrusive
restrictions. 108
The ordinances under review in Butler and Schad were invalid
because they amounted to total suppression of a category of protected
expression. The Minneapolis and Virginia display provisions, in con
trast, merely regulate the manner in which sexually explicit material
can be displayed. The provisions do not suppress completely the ma
terial subject to regulation. 109 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Upper Midwest stressed that the material continued to be available in
Minneapolis and that adults were free to purchase any of the regulated
material. 110 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
American Booksellers held that the Virginia display provisions unrea
sonably interfered with adults' ability to buy the restricted material.
The court, however, did not find that there was total suppression of
sexually explicit material in Virginia. I II Under this analysis, display
provisions, unlike the ordinances struck down in Butler and Schad,
amount to a less-than-total restriction of a category of protected
expression.
B.

Regulations That Result in the Partial Restriction of a Category
of Protected Expression

As previously noted, the Supreme Court has never considered
whether display provisions-as less-than-total restrictions on pro
tected expression-place an impermissible burden on adult access to
sexually explicit material. I 12 The Court has, however, had occasion to
immediate commercial needs of the residents were met already and would not be reduced
by having live entertainment in the commercial zone. Id. Moreover, the Court found that
the range of "permitted uses" in the commercial zones, such as motels, lumber stores,
offices and car showrooms, far exceeded the "immediate needs" of the residents, rendering
the Borough's "immediate needs" argument "patently insufficient." Id. at 73. The borough
also argued that the ban on live entertainment would avoid the problem of the extra burden
on municipal serVices created by live entertainment. The Court rejected this argument
because there was no evidence that live entertainment created greater parking, trash, or
police problems than other existing businesses. Id.
108. Id. at 74.
109. Chief Judge Lay, dissenting in Upper Midwest, argued that the "practical effect"
of the sealed wrapper provision was equivalent to the ordinance in Butler because it re
stricted adult reading to that which was suitable for children. Upper Midwest Booksellers
Ass'n v.City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389, 1404 (8th Cir. 1985) (Lay, C,J., dissenting).
See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
110. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1395.
Ill. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 792 F.2d 1261, 1266 (4th Cir. 1986).
112. At least eleven other state and federal courts, aside from Upper Midwest and
American Booksellers, have reviewed display provisions. The cases provide little or no
guidance in assessing the Minneapolis and Virginia display provisions. In M.S. News Co.

1988]

DISPLA Y PROVISIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

155

consider the impact on protected expression of regulatory schemes
that amount to less-than-total restrictions. 113 In these cases, the
Supreme Court considers a variety of factors to determine whether the
regulatory scheme impermissibly burdens protected expression. 114
v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1983), American Booksellers Ass'n v. Rendell, 332 Pa.
Super. 537, 481 A.2d 919 (1984), and Capital News Co. v. Nashville, 562 S.W.2d 430
(Tenn. 1978), display provisions required sexually explicit material to be displayed behind a
blinder rack or opaque cover. The display provisions under review in each case were con
siderably less restrictive than the Minneapolis and Virginia display provisions.
Several courts have struck down display provisions that regulated material protected
as to adults and children. In each of these cases the definition of "harmful to minors" was
overbroad because it did not conform to the standards enunciated in Miller and Ginsberg.
See Rushia v. Town of Ashburnham, 582 F. Supp. 900 (D. Mass. 1983) (invalidating a
display regulation as constitutionally overbroad because it regulated material not obscene
as to juveniles); American Booksellers Ass'n v. McAuliffe, 533 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(same); Hillsboro News Co. v. City of Tampa, 451 F. Supp. 952 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (ordi
nance restricting display of "offensive sexual material" found unconstitutionally vague);
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. App. 3d 97, 181 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1982) (ordinance overbroad because it required material containing any photo whose pri
mary purpose was sexual arousal to be sealed regardless of whether it was obscene as to
minors); Tattered Cover, Inc. v. Tooley, 696 P.2d 780 (Colo. 1985) (invalidating display
provision as overbroad because it was inconsistent with the standard enunciated in Gins
berg); Dover News, Inc. v. City of Dover, 117 N.H. 1066, 381 A.2d 752 (1977) (invalidat
ing ordinance prohibiting the display below sixty vertical inches of sexually explicit
material defined as harmful to juveniles because the definition included material protected
as to juveniles); Calderon v. City of Buffalo, 61 A.D.2d 323, 402 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1978)
(invalidating the "Anti-Obscenity And Display To Minors Ordinance" as overbroad be
cause it prohibited sale and exhibition of material not obscene as to either juveniles or
adults); Oregon v. Frink, 60 Or. App. 209, 653 P.2d 553 (1982) (statute prohibiting dissem
ination of all nudity to minors was overbroad because it failed to limit prohibition to mate
rial obscene as to juveniles).
113. "Less-than-total" restriction here refers to those regulatory schemes that pur
port to leave open alternative channels of communication. See, e.g., City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1663 (1986); City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); United States Postal Servo V. Coun
cil of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981); F.C.C. V. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726 (1978); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Young V.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Erznoznik V. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205 (1975); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
114. Although the Court has never expressly categorized the various types of bur
dens that limit protected expression, several categories of burdens are readily identifiable.
The various forms of less-than-total restrictions that the Supreme Court has analyzed can
be categorized as follows: first, restrictions that suppress a "uniquely valuable" or "impor
tant" mode or method of communication within a category of expression, without impos
ing a total ban on that category of expression, City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789 (1984) (ordinance prohibiting posters on public property without banning other
modes or methods of conveying the same message), Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Wil
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (ordinance prohibiting house "For Sale" signs without ban
ning other methods of advertising houses for sale); second, restrictions that result in fewer
overall opportunities for access by limiting the locations at which access takes place, City of
Renton V. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1663 (1986)
(concentrating location of adult establishments), Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
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These various forms of less-than-total restrictions on protected expres
sion-and the manner in which the Supreme Court has characterized
their impact-are useful in assessing the impact of display provisions
on adult first amendment rights.
Although the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Eighth Cir
cuits purported to assess the impact of display provisions on adult first
amendment rights, the courts did so without identifying and catego
rizing the ways in which display provisions limit adult access to sexu
ally explicit material. Both courts failed to identify adequately and
assess the types of burdens associated with display provisions. They
also failed to explore the way in which the Supreme Court has viewed
similar burdens in contexts that implicate the first amendment. The
courts thus reached different conclusions about the burdens associated
with display provisions without providing a proper framework for as
sessing those burdens.
1.

Uniquely Valuable or Important Modes of Communication

The Supreme Court has stated that although the first amendment
does not guarantee the right to use every imaginable means of commu
nication in all places at all times,115 a restriction that bans a "uniquely
valuable or important mode of communication" may be invalid if it
threatens the ability to communicate protected expression effec
tively.116 In City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,117 the Court up
427 U.S. 50 (1976) (dispersing location of adult theaters), or the format through which or
the time at which access takes place, F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (limit
ing method and time of access to indecent, non-obscene language); third, restrictions that
result in increased financial burdens on distributors, recipients, or customers of protected
expression, United States Postal Servo V. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114
(1981) (increased cost of mailing civic association notices and pamphlets), Erznoznik V.
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (increased cost of showing drive-in movies); and
fourth, restrictions that deter access by stigmatizing a form of protected expression, La
mont V. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (restrictions which stigmatize protected ex
pression such as communist propaganda deter the exercise of first amendment rights).
115. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647
(1981). The Court has observed that the "guarantees of the First Amendment have never
meant 'that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right
to do so whenever and however and wherever they please.''' Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,
836 (1976) (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,48 (1966)).
116. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984). A restriction
that bans a uniquely valuable or important mode of communication is not synonymous
with an outright ban on a category of expression. The former bans only a particular means
for conveying a message. The latter bans a class of expression, such as political speech, and
in doing so, necessarily bans the means of communication with respect to that class of
expression. The possibility exists, of course, that a particular way of communicating a cate
gory of expression can be so valuable or important to that category that a ban on that
method can amount to a ban on the category of expression.
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held a City ordinance that prohibited the posting of signs on public
property. The City enforced the ordinance by "routinely remov[ing]
all signs attached to utility poles," including posters attached by the
supporters of a political candidate. I IS
Political supporters argued that the posting of political posters on
public property was a "uniquely valuable or important mode of com
munication" and that the ordinance was invalid because it restricted
their ability to communicate their message effectively.119 Other modes
of communication, they argued, were not effective alternatives for con
veying the same political message. 120 The Court rejected this argu
ment, observing that posting signs on public property did not have
communicative advantages over other forms of expression such as
posting signs on private property.l2l Because the supporters could
still convey the same message adequately through the alternatives of
picketing, parading, distributing handbills, and carrying signs or post
ing them on private property, the ban on postings on public property
did not restrict a "uniquely valuable" or "important" mode of
communication. 122
In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,123 how
ever, the Court invalidated a township ordinance that prohibited the
display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs in front of private homes. 124
The township argued that the restriction was valid because it re
stricted only one method of communication and left open "ample al
117. 466 u.s. 789 (1984).
118. Id. at 793. The city argued that the ordinance furthered the substantial govern
ment interests of advancing aesthetic values by reducing clutter and visual blight, and pro
moting traffic safety by removing potential distractions and view obstructions. Id. at 794
95. The ordinance was not designed to single out and suppress particular ideas that the city
found distasteful. The city uniformly applied the ordinance and removed all signs on pub
lic property. Id. at 804. For a discussion of Vincent and the promotion of aesthetics as a
legitimate state interest see Quadres, Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations: The Rise
of the Aesthetic State Interest. the Fall of Judicial Scrutiny, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 439 (1986).
119. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
124. Id. at 86-87. The township argued that the ban on real estate signs was neces
sary to help check the flow of white homeowners from the community. Id. at 88. The
Court rejected this argument because there was no evidence that whites were leaving Wil
lingboro in substantial numbers. Id. at 95. The Township Council believed that the signs
were a "major catalyst" of the fear that the white population of the township was decreas
ing and that a decrease in the number of signs would reduce panic selling and "white
flight." Id. at 88. Rejecting this "assumption," the Court observed that banning signs
might achieve the opposite result by "fuel[ing) public anxiety over sales activity by increas
ing homeowners' dependence on rumor and surmise." Id. at 96 n.lO.
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ternative channels for communication."125 The Court disagreed.
Although the restriction imposed was less-than-total, the only options
that were realistic alternatives, such as newspaper advertisements and
listings with real estate agents, were unsatisfactory.126 These alterna
tives' were far less effective than a "For Sale" sign posted in a front
yard. 127 Moreover, the alternative methods of communication were far
less likely to reach those who were not seeking sales information. 128
Without "For Sale" signs, impulse buyers, most likely, would be una
ware that a particular house was available and, thus, would not in
quire about its purchase. Therefore, the Court viewed "For Sale"
signs as a unique and important method of communication and pro
tected their use.
In Vincent and Linmark, the Court proclaimed that a less-than
total restriction on communication may be invalid if the mode of com
munication is uniquely valuable or important in order to convey a par
ticular message. The availability of alternative means of
communication will not validate the restriction if the mode of commu
nication restricted is so essential that without it, the message cannot be
conveyed effectively.129
Dissenting ilJ. Upper Midwest, Chief Judge Lay observed that a
merchant's ability to sell a particular publication is related directly to
125. Id. at 93 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun
cil, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976».
126. Alternatives such as leaflets, sound trucks, and demonstrations were also un
realistic because they were not methods through which real estate traditionally is adver
tised and were, thus, unlikely to be successful. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93.
127. Real estate agents reported that it took twice as long to sell a piece of real estate
without a "For Sale" sign on the property. Id. at 89.
128. Id. at 93.
129. The Court made this determination in Vincent and Linmark without serious
consideration of the category of speech involved. It struck down the ordinance in Linmark
even though the ordinance involved commercial speech, a category of speech generally not
entitled to the highest degree of first amendment protection. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770-72 (1976) (commer
cial speech, while not excluded entirely from the scope of the first amendment, is not enti
tled to as much protection as other types of speech). The Court upheld the ordinance in
Vincent, however, even though it involved core political speech, generally entitled to the
fullest possible measure of first amendment protection. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n
v. Massachusetts'Citizens for Life, Inc., \07 S, Ct. 616, 631 (1986) (political speech war
rants the highest degree of first amendment protection); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 58
(1982) (the first amendment affords political speech "unequivocal protection"). See also H.
BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 46 (1969) (Protection of political speech "was no
doubt a strong reason for the [First] Amendment's passage."). See also supra note 46.
Nothing in the Supreme Court's analyses in Vincent and Linmark suggests that it would be
unwilling to apply the concept of a uniquely valuable or important mode of communication
to sexually explicit speech.
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the way in which the publication is displayed. Most publications, he
stressed, "are purchased only after a potential reader has had an op
portunity to peruse the book or magazine's contents."130 If a potential
customer is unable to see or browse through a publication while shop
ping because of an opaque cover or sealed wrapper, it is less likely that
he or she will make a purchase. l3I Because the open display of sexu
ally explicit material has advantages over other modes of communica
tion and cannot be duplicated through other means,132 the
Minneapolis and Virginia display provisions are comparable to the re
striction struck down in Linmark.
Potential customers of sexually explicit material are like the im
pulse home buyers in Linmark-if they are unaware of what is avail
able, they are unlikely to buy it. Like the ban on "For Sale" signs in
Linmark, but unlike the ban on signs in Vincent, display provisions
such as opaque covers and sealed wrappers restrict a uniquely valuable
and important mode of communication, the effect of which is not eas
ily duplicated merely because there are available alternatives.
2.

Reduced Opportunity for Access

The Supreme Court has examined restrictions that limit the
number of locations at which protected communication can take
place,133 or the format through which or the time at which the com
munication can be made.134 In Federal Communications Commission
v. Pacifica Foundation, 135 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 136
130. Upper Midwest Booksel1ers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389, 1404
(8th Cir. 1985) (Lay, c.J., dissenting).
13\. See Lynn, Polluting the Censorship Debate: A Summary and Critique of the
Final Report of the Attorney General's Comm'n on Pornography, A.C.L.U. PUB. POL'y
REP. 99 (1986) ("Most laws regarding the shielding of covers are highly dangerous to First
Amendment interests. When an opaque wrapper covers the front of ... [a magazine], not
only does the potential consumer not see a scantily clad woman, but he or she also does not
see what articles are there. ").
132. See text accompanying supra notes 57-58.
133. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), reh'g denied,
\06 S. Ct. 1663 (1986); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
134. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
135. Id. See generally Note, Broadcasting Seven Dirty Words: FCC v. ·Pacifica
Found., 20 B.C.L. REV. 975 (1979); Note, Regulation of Programming Content to Protect
Children After Pacifica, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1377 (1979); Note, Constitutional Law -First
Amendment-FCC May Regulate Broadcast of Non-Obscene Speech, 53 TuL. L. REV. 273
(1978).
136. 429 U.S. 50 (1976). See generally Note, Zoning, Adult Movie Theatres and the
First Amendment: An Approach to Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 5 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 379 (1977); Comment, Municipal Zoning Ordinance May Restrict Location of Adult
Motion Picture Theatres, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 479 (1977).
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and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 137 the Supreme Court
examined less-than-total restrictions on nonobscene, sexually explicit
speech. In each case, the Court assessed the impact of the restriction
on protected expression.
Regulations that limit the format through which or the time at
which access to protected expression can occur are not necessarily in
valid. In Pacifica, the Supreme Court reviewed a Federal Communi
cations Commission declaratory order that prohibited a radio station
from broadcasting a monologue that was indecent, but not obscene,
during a time of day when children were likely to be exposed to. the
broadcast. J38 The Commission characterized the monologue as "pa
tently offensive" and sought to protect children from its harmful ef
fects.139 The radio station argued that because the monologue was not
obscene, the first amendment prohibited the government from restrict
ing the public broadcast of language that was merely indecent. 140 The
Supreme Court rejected this argument and upheld the Commission's
declaratory order.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell stressed that although the
restriction might limit the times at which adults could hear the mono
logue, its effect would not limit the opportunity of adults to hear only
that which was fit for children. 141 Adults could still purchase Carlin's
monologue at record stores, attend live Carlin performances, or read
"the transcript [of the monologue] reprinted as an appendix to the
Court's opinion."142 Moreover, Pacifica was not prohibited from
broadcasting the monologue late in the evening when children were
less likely to be in the broadcasting audience. 143
Although the restriction upheld in Pacifica made it less likely that
137. 475 U.S. 41 (1986), reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1663 (1986). See generally Com·
ment, The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Ordinances Regulating Adult Estab
lishments, 30 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 315, 319-31 (1986).
138. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731-32. The Commission had acted in response to a com
plaint from a father who heard an afternoon broadcast of George Carlin's "Filthy Words"
monologue while driving with his young son. !d. at 729-30.
139. Id. at 731. The Commission's "primary concern was to prevent the broadcast
[of the monologue] from reaching the ears of unsupervised children" who were likely to be
listening to the radio during the afternoon hours. Id. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring). If the
monologue were broadcast late at night it would be less likely that children would be ex
posed to it. Id. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 744.
141. Id. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383
(1957».
142. Id.
143. Id. The Commission's holding, on its face, and the Court's opinion, only ad
dressed the question of broadcasting the monologue during the day.
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adults would hear Carlin's monologue on the radio, there were other
formats through which adults could obtain access to the monologue.
Display provisions ·also amount to a less-than-total restriction on adult
access to sexually explicit material protected as to adults. Display
provisions, and the broadcasting restriction in Pacifica, are both
designed to protect children from exposure to sexually explicit mate
rial that is harmful to them by restricting access to expression. l44
Both restrictions leave untouched other formats through which the
same expression can occur.14S For instance, in Pacifica, although
adults are unable to hear the Carlin monologue at certain times on the
radio, the expression is available in other formats, such as records or a
printed transcript. Likewise, although display provisions prevent
adults from having wholly unimpeded access to sexually explicit mate
rial, the material remains available in different formats, such as
"adults only" stores or with an opaque cover or in a sealed wrapper.
The Supreme Court also has addressed regulations that limit the
locations at which protected expression can occur. In Young, the
Court upheld a Detroit zoning ordinance that sought to preserve and
stabilize neighborhoods by dispersing the location of adult theaters. 146
The Court noted that the restriction on the location of theaters im-'
posed a minimal burden on protected speech because although adult
theaters were dispersed, their total numbers were not reduced and the
market for the commodity was "essentially unrestrained."147 The
144. This comparison, however, is not without limitations. The Court in Pacifica
emphasized the "narrowness" of the holding, Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750, explaining that
radio broadcasting has a "uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans" and
that it is "uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read." Id. at 748-49.
Moreover, broadcasting has "received the most limited First Amendment protection." Id.
at 748. Radio broadcasts, unlike material on display in a bookstore, confront individuals in
the privacy of the home, involve a potentially captive audience, and are uniquely accessible
to young children. Radio broadcasts are thus subject to greater regulation than other
modes of communication. As the Court observed in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.,
463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983), "[priOI'] decisions have recognized that the special interest of the
Federal Government in regulation of the broadcast media does not readily translate into a
justification for regulation of other means of communication." Id. at 74 (footnote omitted).
145. A notable distinction is that the display provisions in Upper Midwest and Ameri
can Booksellers apply under all circumstances where children may have access to sexually
explicit material, while the restriction in Pacifica applies only during certain times of day.
146. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 50 (1976). Those theaters
which exhibited sexually explicit films were classified as "adult" theaters. Adult theaters
had to satisfy a location restriction not applicable to other types of theaters. The zoning
ordinance prohibited a new adult theater from being located within 500 feet of a residential
area. Id. at 52. The Detroit City Council had determined that "some uses of property
[such as adult entertainment] are especially injurious to a neighborhood when they are
concentrated in limited areas." Id. at 54.
147. Id. at 62.

162

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:\33

zoning ordinance was valid because it served "the city's interest in
preserving the character of its neighborhoods"148 and was minimal in
terms of first amendment impact. The Court in Young warned, how
ever, that "the situation would be quite different if the ordinance had
the effect ,of suppressing, or greatly restricting. access to, lawful
speech." 149
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell stressed that the "central
concern of the First Amendment in this area is that there be a free
flow [of expression] from creator to audience," and that the public
maintain free access to the expression. ISO He concluded that the im
148.. Id. at 71. The Court upheld the ordinance despite the fact that the determina
tion of whether a particular theater was an "adult" theater turned on the content of the
films exhibited at that theater. Young is thus an "exception[ ] to the general rule prevent
ing government regulation based upon the content of speech." Schauer, Fear, Risk and the
First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. REV. 685, 715 n.l44 (1978).
In Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), the Supreme Court emphasized that the
"First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Id. at 95. See also Cohen v. Cali
fornia, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). The Court in Young observed that if this statement was
"read literally" it would "absolutely preclude any regulation of expressive activity predi
cated in whole or in part on the content of the communication." Young, 427 U.S. at 65.
The Court in Young chose not to read the statement literally because "a difference in con
tent may require a different governmental response." Id. at 66. The government, however,
must remain neutral without regulating on the basis of "sympathy or hostility" for a partic
ular message. Id. at 67.
The zoning ordinance in Young was a reaction to the concern that a concentration of
"adult" theaters in the same area would attract "undesirable" transients, reduce property
values, increase crime, and cause residents and businesses to flee from the neighborhood.
Id. at 55. The ordinance was upheld because it was these "secondary effect[sl" which the
ordinance sought to avoid, not the dissemination of sexually explicit speech. Id. at 71 n.34.
Disparate treatment of adult theaters was thus justified by a "compelling public interest" in
the preservation and stabilization of neighborhoods and unrelated to the suppression of
expression based on content. Id. at 57 n.14 (quoting American Mini Theatres v. Gibbs, 518
F.2d 1014, 1020 (6th Cir. 1975)). Cf Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205
(1975), in which the justifications offered by the city for regulating drive-in theaters rested
primarily on a government interest in protecting citizens from unwanted exposure to
nudity, not its secondary effects. The Court invalidated the regulation because the impact
on traffic safety-the only secondary effect cited by the city-was an effect which might
have also been caused by any drive-in movie, even one that did not contain nudity. Id. at
214-15.
149. Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.35. Other courts interpret this footnote to mean that
an ordinance is unconstitutional if its effect, rather than the intent, is to "suppress or
greatly restrict" adult access to protected expression. See Comment, supra note 137, at
nl~3.
.
150. Young, 427 U.S. at 77 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell's concern was
that there must be a full opportunity to convey a message and a full opportunity to receive
it. Id. at 76. He proposed a two-part inquiry for assessing the impact of the less-than-total
restriction on protected expression: (I) whether it imposes a limit on a creator's ability to
make material available; and (2) whether it "restrict[s] in any significant way" those who
desire access to the protected expression. /d. at 78.
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pact of the zoning ordinance on protected expression was "incidental
and minimal."151 Adult theaters still had full opportunity to convey
their message and the viewing public still had full opportunity to view
the films. 152
While the zoning ordinance in Young sought to preserve neigh
borhoods by dispersing adult theaters, the zoning ordinance under re
view in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. sought to regulate
adult theaters by concentrating their location. 153 Reversing the deci
sion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held
that the Renton ordinance did not violate the first amendment because
it did not ban adult theaters altogether. Instead, as a less-than-total
restriction, it merely regulated where adult theaters could be
located. 154
Potential adult theater owners argued that the ordinance did not
allow for "reasonable alternative avenues of communication." 155 The
ordinance, they argued, denied them a reasonable opportunity to open
and operate an adult theater within the city because they were ex
cluded from ninety-five percent of the city's land. 156 The Court re
jected this argument and implied that the remaining five percent of the
city's land, or 520 acres, provided a reasonable and ample alternative
for use as adult theater sites. The first amendment was not violated
merely because the allotted land was less desirable economically.157
Read together, Young and Renton indicate that the Court will be
less concerned with first amendment implications when zoning regula
151. Id. at 78 (footnote omitted).
152. Id. at 78-79.
153. 475 U.S. 41 (1986), reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1663 (1986).
154. Id. at 46. Because the Renton ordinance regulated the place in which adult
films could be displayed, the Court considered whether it was a valid time, place, and
manner regulation. First, the Court found that the ordinance was content-neutral because
its "predominate concern[ ]" was with the undesirable "secondary effects" of adult theatres,
and not with the suppression of unpopular views. Id. at 47. Second, the Court found that
the ordinance sought to serve the substantial government interest in preserving the quality
of urban life. Id. at 50. The Court also considered whether the ordinance allowed for
"reasonable alternative avenues of communication." Id. See infra notes 155-56 and ac
companying text.
155. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50. The challengers were the owners of two existing thea
ters in Renton. They had acquired the theaters with the intent of using them as adult
theaters but were precluded from doing so under the zoning ordinance. Id. at 45.
156. Id. at 53. The theater owners claimed that there were no "commercially viable"
sites available in the remaining five percent of the city land. Id.
157. Id. at 54. Justice Brennan dissented. He argued that the ordinance imposed
"special restrictions" on particular kinds of speech based on the content. His concern was
that the ordinance may have been designed to suppress the content of adult movies and not
designed to avoid the harmful "secondary effects" of adult theaters. Id. at 56-57 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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tions limit, without suppressing, the places in which sexually explicit
expression can occur. The Court stressed that the restrictions on loca
tion in each case were valid because they did not suppress adult thea
ters completely and left some locations available as potential sites for
new theaters. Moreover, the zoning ordinances were valid because
they were a response to the harmful secondary effects of the location of
adult theaters and not because of viewer response to the content of the
movies shown at the theaters. 158
In theory, the zoning ordinances under review did not limit pro
tected expression at its source, nor did they limit the ability of adults
to view the protected expression. In practice, the ordinances, by re
ducing the total number of available locations for adult theaters, lim
ited the potential number of theaters. 159 The economic undesirability
of the locations available under the ordinance further reduced the po
tential number of theaters. Although the Court in Young claimed that
the outcome would have been different if the ordinance had the "effect
of suppressing" or "greatly restricting access to" protected expres
sion, 160 the Court in Renton upheld a restriction that left theater own
ers with limited options. 161 The Court, in effect, held that as long as
there were avenues of expression available, the restrictions did not vio
late the first amendment even if they served to reduce the total number
of adult theaters by reducing the available locations at which the ex
pression could take place ..
Under this standard, display provisions are considerably less re
strictive than the ordinances upheld in Young and Renton. Unlike the
zoning ordinances in Young and Renton, display provisions do not re
duce directly the availability of the material subject to regulation. In
Young and Renton there were fewer potential outlets for expression as
a direct result of the ordinances. Display provisions, however, result
in an indirect reduction of outlets for sexually explicit material if
merchants, rather than facing the burden of compliance with display
restrictions, decide to limit their inventory to material not subject to
regulation. It is unlikely that this reduction amounts to the functional
equivalent of suppression or the type of significant restriction on ac
158. In this respect, display provisions differ from the zoning regulations in Young
and Renton. Display provisions are designed to protect juveniles from the harmful effects
of the content of sexually explicit material and not from the harmful secondary effects that
mayor may not be generated from open display of the material.
159. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
160. Young. 427 U.S. at 71 n.35.
16 t. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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cess to protected expression that is necessary to invalidate display pro
visions under the standards announced in Young or Renton.
Because display provisions only alter the format in which sexually
explicit material can be displayed, they are consistent with the ap
proach in Pacifica which allows the restriction of a particular means of
expression, provided that other formats for the same expression re
main available. The Supreme Court has not viewed reductions in the
number of outlets through which expression can take place, or the
format through which expression can occur, as serious first amend
ment infringements. Display provisions, in this respect, will likely
pass constitutional muster.
3.

Increased Financial Burden

The Supreme Court has examined regulations that impose a fi
nancial burden on protected expression and thereby deter the exercise
of first amendment activities. 162 Although "[t]here is no such thing as
a free speech,"163 the first amendment offers protection against undue
financial burdens on freedom of expression. l64 The burden imposed
on the exercise of protected first amendment activities must be signifi
cant in order for the regulatory scheme giving rise to the burden to be
invalid. 165
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, the Supreme Court invali
dated a city ordinance that prohibited drive-in movie theaters from
showing films containing nudity when the movie screen was visible
from a public street or place. 166 The City of Jacksonville argued that
the ordinance was valid because it regulated only the manner in which
films could be shown and served the legitimate governmental interests
of protecting citizens from "unwilling" exposure to offensive mate
rial,167 protecting children,168 and promoting traffic safety. 169
162. See Neisser, Charging for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the Market
place of Ideas, 74 GEO. L.J. 257 (1985). See also Central Fla. Nuclear Freeze Campaign v.
Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1985) (conditioning the exercise of first amendment rights
upon the payment of a substantial and unreasonable fee for additional police protection
places an impermissible burden on the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech);
Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group v. Powers, 723 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1983) (invalidat
ing insurance and administrative fee requirements for political march because they imposed
a prohibitive financial burden on first amendment rights).
163. Neisser, supra note 162, at 258.
164. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575 (1983) (state may not single out press for special use tax).
165. United States Postal Servo v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
127 (1981).
166. 422 U.S. 205, 206 (1975).
167. Id. at 208, 212. The Court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, the
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The Supreme Court focused its analysis on the impact that the
ordinance would have on the continued availability of movies contain
ing even harmless forms of nudity. 170 Although the ordinance was not
an outright ban on movies containing nudity, the net result of the ordi
nance was to "deter drive-in theaters from showing movies containing
any nudity ...."171 The Court found that although theater owners
were still free to show films containing nudity if they blocked the
screen from public view, the owners would avoid the costs of blocking
the screen from public view by not showing certain films.l72 This de
terrent effect of the ordinance on first amendment rights was too great.
The Court found that "the owners and operators of these theaters are
faced with an unwelcome choice: to avoid prosecution ... they must
either restrict their movie offerings or construct adequate protective
fencing which may be extremely expensive or even physically imprac
ticable."173 The Court noted that although the deterrent effect of the
ordinance might not result in "total suppression" of the movies subject
to regulation, it was nevertheless an impermissible restraint on free
dom of expression. 174
The Minneapolis and Virginia display provisions, because of the'
ordinance did not protect citizens from all types of movies that might be offensive. Id. at
20S. Second, offended viewers who were able to see the screen from public or private places
had the option not to look. Id. at 212.
16S. Id. at 212. The Court rejected this argument because the overbreadth of the
ordinance included films that were not obscene as to children. See infra notes 170-71 and
accompanying text.
169. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 214-15. The Court found that the state interest in traffic
safety was not met by the ordinance because scenes from any movie, not only those con
taining nudity, could be equally distracting to motorists. Id.
Moreover, because the legislative classification focused on the subject matter or con
tent of expression, the Court did not presume validity of the ordinance without further
inquiry. Id. at 215. While recognizing the general rule that a municipality can enact rea
sonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as they are "applicable to all speech
irrespective of content," id. at 209, the Court noted that a content-based regulation might
withstand constitutional review if there were clear reasons for the differences in treatment.
Id. at 215. The Jacksonville ordinance was invalid because there was no justification for
treating movies containing nudity differently from other movies in an ordinance designed to
promote traffic safety. Id.
170. Id. at 213. The ordinance was overbroad because it prohibited harmless forms
of nudity that were protected as to adults and children, such as a nude baby or the nude
body of a war victim. Id.
171. Id.at211.
172. Id.at21In.7.
173. Id. at 217. Although the record did not indicate how much it would cost to
block a theater from public view, the Court noted that in one case the cost was prohibitive.
Id. at 211 n.S (citing Olympic Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. City of Pagedale, 441 S.W.2d 5, 9
10 (Mo. 1969».
174. Id. at 211 n.S.
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increased financial burdens that they place on booksellers, may have a
similar deterrent effect on the exercise of first amendment rights. In
order to avoid the costs associated with complying with the display
provisions, merchants might decide not to carry any of the material
subject to regulation-just as the theater owners in Erznoznik might
have decided not to show certain films in order to avoid the cost of
blocking their screens from public view.
Display provisions interfere with the booksellers' business prac
tices,175 "place a heavy burden on [some] store owners to restructure
their stores"176 and result in financial burdens on the booksellers. If
the merchant is required to move sexually explicit merchandise to an
"adults only" section of the store, the merchant may have to restruc
ture the layout of the store. This might not be practical, or even possi
ble, in some stores because of space limitations or a selling area that
does not lend itself to change. The merchant may decide not to
restructure the store to accommodate an "adults only" section and,
therefore, would be unable to openly stock the material subject to reg
ulation. Even if the layout of a store makes an "adults only" section
feasible, merchants may be unwilling to absorb the extra cost of re
structuring their selling areas to establish "adults only" sections.
Under the Minneapolis ordinance and, perhaps, the Virginia ordi
nance, merchants who do not establish "adults only" sections would
then be required either to discontinue offering the material subject to
regulation, or display it with sealed wrappers or opaque covers. Both
alternatives result in increased financial burdens. These financial bur
dens may also deter booksellers from stocking and attempting to sell
sexually explicit material.
Despite the Court's willingness to consider increased costs in
Erznoznik, the increased financial burdens associated with display pro
visions may not give rise to the type of restriction on protected expres
sion that violates the first amendment.177 In United States Postal
Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations,178 the Supreme
Court reviewed a civic association's challenge of a federal statute that
prohibited the placement of "mailable matter" on which no postage
175. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 802 F.2d 691, 696 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, \07 S. Ct. 1281 (1987).
176. Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389, 1404
(8th Cir. 1985) (Lay, c.J., dissenting).
177. The Court in Erznoznik considered factors other than increased financial bur
dens when it invalidated the ordinance under review. See supra notes 167-70 and accompa
nying text.
178. 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
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had been paid, in any private letterbox approved for the receipt or
delivery of mail. 179 The civic association had a "practice of delivering
messages to local residents by placing unstamped notices and pam
phlets in the [private] letterboxes."18o When the local postmaster noti
fied the association that they were in violation of federal law, the
association sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The association
argued that enforcement of the statute would "inhibit their communi
cation with residents ... and would thereby deny them the freedom of
speech secured by the First Amendment."181
The association also argued that they were unable to afford the
cost of postage and that the alternative of depositing their materials in
places other than letterboxes was less effective than their usual prac
tice. 182 The Court upheld the statute 183 despite evidence that the re
striction was "financially burdensome" on the association and that the
alternative delivery methods constituted a "serious burden [on their]
ability to communicate with their constituents." 184 The Court was un
179. 18 U.S.c. § 1725 (1982).
180. Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 116.
181. Id. at 116-17.
182. Id. at 134-35 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Postal Service argued that enforce
ment of the restriction was necessary to ensure effective mail delivery and protection of the
mails. Id. at 117-18. Moreover, it argued that the council was left with "ample alternative
means of delivering their message," including paying postage, hanging notices on door
knobs, placing notices under doors or doormats, telephoning residents, person-to-person
delivery in public areas, tacking or taping notices on a door post or letterbox post, or
placing newspaper advertisements. Id. at 119.
183. The Court based its decision to uphold the statute on the finding that a letterbox
is not a public forum. Id. at 128. As an "authorized depository" for the delivery and
receipt of mail, a letterbox is not transformed into a "public forum" such as a public street
or park, to which the first amendment guarantees unlimited access. Id. at 128-31. Prop
erty which is not a public forum "may be subject to a prohibition of speech ... or other
forms of communication without running afoul of the First Amendment." Id. at 131 n.7.
The Court's emphasis on public forum analysis only served to distract the Court from
proper consideration of the extent to which the Postal Service regulation inhibited the abil
ity of the civic association to communicate with residents. Professors Farber and Nowak
have argued that "[e]ven when public forum analysis is irrelevant to the outcome of a case,
the judicial focus on the public forum concept confuses the development of first amendment
principles." Farber & Nowak, supra note 95, at 1223. For example, in Greenburgh, the
real issue was whether the limitation on public access "so inhibited the communication of
ideas as to be inconsistent with the first amendment." Id. An emphasis in Greenburgh on
public forum analysis distracted attention from proper consideration of the first amend
ment concerns at stake. Id.
184. Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 119-20. Hanging notices on doorknobs or doorposts
could result in the notices being lost or damaged by the elements. Id. at 120 n.2. Weather
stripping on doors would prevent notices from being placed under the door and the use of
plastic bags for the protection of notices left outside would be "relatively expensive for a
small volunteer organization." Id. (quoting Greenburgh Civic Ass'n v. United States Pos
tal Serv., 490 F. Supp. 157,160 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). Furthermore, the relatively slow pace of
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moved by the fact that none of the alternative means of delivery sug
gested by the Postal Service were nearly as effective as placing notices
in letterboxes.
Unlike Erznoznik, Greenburgh suggests that the Court is uncon
cerned about the financial burdens associated with a regulatory
scheme that affects protected expression, as long as ample opportuni
ties for expression still exist. Under the standard applied in Green
burgh, the additional costs associated with display provisions would
have to be substantial in order for the regulatory scheme to violate the
first amendment.
4.

Restrictions Resulting in Stigmatization

The display provisions under review in Upper Midwest 185 and
American Booksellers 186 attach a stigma 187 to sexually explicit mate
rial. 188 The effect of this stigma may be to deter impermissibly adults
from seeking access to the material. In Upper Midwest, Chief Judge
Lay observed that "many adults who would be required to unseal this
[sexually explicit] literature in public areas in order to peruse the book
or magazine would be embarrassed to do SO."189 He also found that
there was a "stigma" attached to an "adults only" label. 190 Many
adults might "forgo exercising their first amendment rights to
purchase nonobscene literature if such material were only available" in
"adults only" sections or stores. 191
In Wieman v. Updegraff, Justice Black observed that "laws which
stigmatize ... thought and speech ... have a way of reaching, ensnar
mail delivery would, when time was of the essence, impede the ability of civic associations
to communicate quickly with their constituents. Id. at 120.
185. Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th
Cir. 1985).
186. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 802 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 1281 (1987).
187. Stigma is defined as "a mark of shame or discredit" or "a mark or label indicat
ing deviation from a norm." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2243 (14th ed.
1961 ).
188. The stigma associated with sexually explicit material may, of course, exist even
without display provisions. Display provisions may merely exacerbate the degree of stigma
involved. Moreover, stigma "has no clearly defined constitutional meaning. It reflects a
subjective judgment that is standardless." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 294 n.34 (1978).
189. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1404 (Lay, C.]., dissenting).
190. Id. at 1402.
191. Id. In American Booksellers, the court observed that "[m]any adults, for a vari
ety of reasons, would not enter a display area identified as 'for adults only.''' American
Booksellers, 802 F.2d at 696. The court, presumably, was referring to the stigma now at
tached to sexually explicit material as a result of the "adults only" label.
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ing and silencing many more people than at first intended."192 The
Supreme Court has considered the role that stigma plays in altering
human behavior and perceptions in a variety of settings and circum
stances, including public education,193 prisons,194 civil proceedings, 195
juvenile offender proceedings,. 96 and racial discrimination. 197
In Lamont v. Postmaster General, 198 the Supreme Court reviewed
a federal statute 199 that required the Postmaster General to detain un
sealed foreign mailings to the United States of "communist political
propaganda."2°O Under the statute, the post office mailed the ad
dressee a notice identifying the mail being detained and advising that
the mail would be destroyed unless the addressee returned an attached
reply card to the post office within twenty days.201 The Post Office
Department assumed that those who did not return the card did not
want to receive the identified publication or any similar
publications.202
The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because the
government's imposition of an affirmative obligation on addressees
the return of the reply card-constituted an abridgement of the ad
dressee's first amendment rights.203 Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority, concluded that the affirmative obligation imposed by the
government was "almost certain to have a deterrent effect," especially
192. 344 u.S. 183, 193 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
193. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,223 (1982) (Children that are denied a basic educa
tion will be marked by the "stigma of illiteracy ... for the rest of their lives.").
194. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473 (1983) ("Unlike disciplinary confinement
the stigma of wrongdoing or misconduct does not attach to administrative segregation
under Pennsylvania's prison regulations.").
195. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 163 (1974) (Civil Service Commission post
termination hearing procedures adequately protect federal employees from being "wrong
fully stigmatized by untrue and unsupported administrative charges.").
196. Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97, 107 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(prohibiting, under some circumstances, the publication of the name of a juvenile charged
as a juvenile offender transcends first amendment concerns and serves "to protect the
young person from the stigma of his misconduct").
197. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980) (upholding Minority Business
Enterprise provision which sought to remedy the present effects and stigma associated with
past discrimination); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357-58 (1978)
(Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J., and Blackman, J., concurring and dissenting) (catego
ries based on race used to stigmatize politically powerless segments.of society are invalid).
198. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
199. Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962,39 U.S.c. § 4oo8(a)
(1962).
200. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 302-04.
201. Id. at 303.
202. Id. at 304.
203. Id. at 305-07.
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on tho~e with "sensitive positions."204 He emphasized that any ad
dressee would be "likely to feel some inhibition in sending for litera
ture" which the government had condemned as "communist political
. propaganda. "205 The statute, because of its deterrent effect on the ex
ercise of first amendment rights, was thus an impermissible restriction
on the manner in which the communist publications were distrib
uted-'--even though addressees still had complete access to the material
by simply returning the reply card.
The display provisions in Upper Midwest may also inhibit and de
ter adults from obtaining protected material.. The inhibition in La
mont arose from the stigma that the government placed on the
material by labeling it "communist."206 At the time, when anti-com
munist sentiment in the United States was high, the label of "commu
nist" provided a strong deterrent to the exercise of first amendment
rights. Display provisions, in this respect, also inhibit the exercise of
first amendment rights. Public attention has focused on the issue of
pornography207 and there have been increased efforts to limit access to
pornographic materials. 208 As the Court noted in American Booksell
ers, "adults only" labels and sealed wrappers place a stigma on sexu
ally explicit material. The stigma might deter adult access to material
protected by the first amendment. Moreover, sealed wrapper provi
sions may, in effect, require adults to request an inspection copy of the
material from a merchant in order to decide whether to make the
purchase, something that they are unaccustomed to doing. The impo
sition of such an affirmative obligation is contrary to the holding in
Lamont. Display provisions, like the statute in Lamont, may well be
inconsistent with the "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" debate and
discussion contemplated by the first amendment. 209
Id. at 307.
205. Id.
206. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 301, involved core political speech, not sexually explicit
speech.
207. See REP. OF THE ATT'y GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY (1986). The
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography was chartered to "determine the nature,
extent, and impact on society of pornography in the United States, and to make specific
recommendations to the Attorney General concerning more effective ways in which the
spread of pornography could be contained consistent with constitutional guarantees." Id.
at 1957. But see also Lynn, supra note 131, at 1 ("Although their final Report [report of
the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography] is voluminous, it is ultimately an
unsatisfying analysis, failing to take the reader very far toward understanding what roles
pornography plays in our culture, and why it is such a massive business enterprise. ");
Vance, Porn in the U.S.A.: The Meese Commission on the Road, THE NATION, Aug. 2/9,
1986 at 65.
208. The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 23, 1986 at 11, col. I.
209. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Political speech
204.
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CONCLUSION

Although the Minneapolis and Virginia display provisions are un
like the total bans on protected expression struck down in Butler and
Schad, they may place an impermissible burden on adult access to sex
ually explicit material. The display provisions under review in Upper
Midwest and American Booksellers cannot be justified merely because
they seek to protect juveniles from exposure to sexually explicit mate
rial obscene as to juveniles. Because the material subject to regulation
is not obscene as to adults, it becomes necessary to assess the impact of
display provisions on adult access to the same material.
Display provisions, as less-than-total restrictions on adult access,
limit adult access to protected expression in several ways. If some
merchants decide not to stock sexually explicit material-rather than
face the burden of complying with the requirements of a display provi
sion-there will be a reduced opportunity for adults to obtain the ma
terial. A mere reduction in the number of outlets at which expression
can occur, without more, is not sufficient to invalidate display provi
sions as long as a meaningful opportunity for access remains. 2JO Simi
larly, under the Court's approach in Pacifica, a restriction that merely
limits the format through which expression can take place does not
provide sufficient grounds to invalidate the regulation.
Display provisions also impose a financial burden on protected
expression by increasing the cost of distributing and purchasing sexu
ally explicit material. The increased financial burdens associated with
display provisions may deter adult access to material that adults are
entitled to obtain under the first amendment. Financial burdens, how
ever, must be substantial in order for the regulatory scheme under re
view to violate the first amendment. Although a reduction in the
number of outlets at which protected expression can occur and the
increased financial burdens associated with display provision are not
sufficient to invalidate a display provision, at least two other burdens
associated with the provisions are significant under standards drawn
from previous cases.
Because the way in which a publication is displayed is directly
related to a store owner's ability to sell the material, opaque cover
requirements and sealed wrapper provisions restrict a "uniquely valua
may, of course, be entitled to greater protection than non-obscene, sexually explicit expres
sion. See supra note 46. This distinction, however, does not mean that substantial burdens
placed on sexually explicit expression do not violate the first amendment. See supra note
129.

210.

See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.

1988]

DISPLA Y PROVISIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

173

ble" and "important" mode of communication under the standard an
nounced in Vincent and Linmark. The display alternatives available
to merchants in Minneapolis and Virginia are not "ample alternative
channels for communication."211 Moreover, display provisions stigma
tize sexually explicit material. The combined effect of these burdens
on expression protected under the first amendment presents a serious
case for invalidating the display provisions under review in Upper
Midwest and American Booksellers.
Samuel D. Friedlander

21\. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976».

